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SECTION 8(b) (4) (A) LMRA
Secondary boycotts, as most other forms of organized labor
activity, were long condemned by the common law on the basis of such
theories as conspiracy and inducing breach of contract.' However, the
courts were more dilatory in recognizing secondary boycotts as a legiti-
mate labor action than was generally true of primary strikes and boy-
cotts. As late as 1927, the prevailing view in this country was that the
secondary boycott could not be lawfully employed in a labor dispute,
whatever the methods used and however justifiable the objectives may
have been. 2
The exact definition and true nature of secondary boycotts have
been the subject 'of considerable controversy.3 Generally, however, the
use of any coercive pressures against third persons to force cessation
of dealings with the employer with whom the dispute exists is a secondary
boycott. The hostile attitude of the courts is largely traceable to their
disapproval of any interference with the freedom of action of persons
who are thought to be unconcerned with the basic labor dispute.4 Typical
of the types of union conduct which have been condemned as secondary
boycotts are: strikes, 5 threats to strike,6 and picketing7 of neutral
employers doing business with the employer with whom the basic dispute
1. For an account of the historical development and application of these theories
to labor activities, see GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW C. 1-6 (Rev. ed. 1949) ; 1 TELLER,
LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING C. 1-6 (1940).
2. OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS 658 (1928).
3. See FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 42 (1930) ; MILLIS AND
MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR 581 (1945); OAKES, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 602;
Bafnard and Graham, Labor and the Secondary Boycott, 15 WASH. L. REv. 136 (1940) ;
Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 YALE L.J. 341 (1938) ; Note, 15
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 327 (1947).
4. See MILLIS AND MONTGOMERY, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 584; 1 TELLER, op. cit.
snpra note 1, § 150.
5. E.g., Bricklayers Union v. Seymour Ruff & Sons, 160 Md. 483, 154 Atl. 52
(1931); A. T. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N.E. 82 (1927);
Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S.W. 997 (1908).
6. E.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1920); Armstrong
Cork & Insulation Co. v. Walsh, 276 Mass. 263, 177 N.E. 2 (1931); Purvis v. Local
No. 500, 214 Pa. St. 348, 63 Atl. 585 (1906).
7. E.g., Muncie Bldg. Trades Council v. Umbarger, 215 Ind. 13, 17 N.E.2d 828
(1938) ; Van Buskirk v. Sign Painters, 127 N.J. Eq. 533, 14 A.2d 45 (1940) ; United
Union Brewing Co. v. Dave Beck, 100 Wash. 412, 93 P.2d 772 (1939).
NOTES
existed; refusing to work on materials destined for8 or to handle the
products of the disputing employer;9 the use of unfair lists ;10 and
refusal to work on the same job with non-union employees.",
The opposition to secofidary boycotts was effectuated chiefly by
means of injunctions, although civil and criminal penalties were also
available.' 2 Secondary activities which interfered with interstAte com-
merce frequently ran afoul of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and were
enjoinable in the federal courts. 13 Perhaps the peak of judicial restric-
tions on secondary boycotts was reached in the Bedford Cut Stone
Case,14 decided in 1927. The Supreme Court held the Journeymen Stone
Cutters Association's refusal to work on building stone, which had been
quarried by non-union employees working in opposition to the Associa-
tion, an illegal restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
In relatively recent years, many courts have gradually taken the
view that secondary union activities should be permitted when justified. 15
This development has not proceeded uniformly among the states and
frequently has been achieved by characterizing the conduct in question
"primary," rather than "secondary." Factors contributing'to this judi-
cial acceptance have been an increasing realization that the so-called
neutral third parties often seriously threatened the wages and working
conditions of the employees engaged in the secondary boycott, and the
belief that the secondary boycott weapon was necessary to enable the
unions to counterbalance combined activities of employers in opposition
to unions, such as the circulation of blacklists.16
Refusals to work on materials furnished by a non-union employer,' 7
8. Burgess Bros. v. Stewart, 112 Misc. 347, 184 N.Y. Supp. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
9. E.g., March v. Bricklayers Union, 79 Conn. 7, 63 Atl. 291 (1906) ; A. T. Stearns
Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N.E. 82 (1927) ; 264 Mass. 511, 163 N.E. 193
(1928) ; Purvis v. Local No. 500, 214 Pa. St. 348, 63 Ati. 585 (1906).
10. E.g., Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 83 N.E. 928 (1908); My Maryland Lodge
v. Adt, 100 Md. 238, 59 Atl. 721 (1905); Branson v. I.W.W., 30 Nev. 270, 95 Pac.
354 (1908).
11. E.g., Blandford v. Duthie, 147 Md. 388, 128 At. 138 (1925); Lehigh Structural
Steel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting & Refining Works, 92 N.J. Eq. 131, 111 Atl. 376 (1920) ;
W. A. Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382, 116 N.E. 801 (1917).
12. See, generally, FRANKFURTER ,AND GREEN, op. cit. stepra note 3.
13. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927) ;
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) ; Gompers v. Bucks Stove
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). Sei GREGORY,
op. cit. supra note 1, c. 8-9.
- 14. 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
15. See Mns AND BROWN, FRom THE WAGNER AcT To TAFT-HARTLEY 460 (1950);
GRaORY, op. cit. supra. note 1, at 153; Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 369.
16. See authorities cited in note 15 supra; MILLIS AND MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 369.
17. E.g., J..F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac.
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refusals to work on the job with non-union men, 8 and placing the dis-
puting employer on an unfair list 9 were among the first types of sec-
ondary boycott permitted. More recently picketing the product of the
primary employer while in the hands of distributors2 ° has been recog-
nized as legitimate union conduct by some courts, usually under a "unity
of interest" theory.21 Perhaps even more important than the changing
attitude of the courts has been the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act,22 with many similar state anti-injunction statutes,23 and the con-
stitutional protection afforded picketing as a form of free speech after
Thornhill v. Alabama. 24  The Sherman Act no longer constitutes a
barrier,25 and the imposition of civil and criminal penalties is not nearly
so effective a preventive as was the injunction.26
Unfortunately, this partial immunity from legal prohibitions was
accompanied by increasing abuse in the employment of secondary boy-
cotts. Particularly disruptive was their use in furtherance of jurisdic-
1027 (1908); State v. Van Pelt, 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177 (1904); Bossert v. Dhuy,
221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582 (1917).
18. E.g., Meier v. Spier, 96 Ark. 618, 132 S.W. 988 (1910); Jetton-Delke Lumber
Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907) ; National Ass'n Steamfitters v. Cumming,
170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902).
19. E.g., Truax v. Bisbee Local, 19 Ariz. 379, 171 Pac. 121 (1917) ; Lindsay & Co.
v. Montana Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127 (1908) ; Perfect Laundry v.
Marsh, 120 N.J. Eq. 508, 186 At. 470 (1936).
20. Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 405, 106 P.2d 411 (1940); Wagner v.
Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 320 Ill. App. 341, 50 N.E.2d 865 (1943); Johnson v. Milk
Drivers Union, 195 So. 791 (La. App. 1940); Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y.
281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937) ; Alliance Auto Service, Inc. v. Cohen, 341 Pa. 283, 19 A.2d
152 (1941). Cf. Weist v. Dirks, 215 Ind. 568, 20 N.E.2d 969 (1939).
21. The "unity of interest" doctrine has been principally developed by the New
York courts. A unity of interest is said to exist between two employers when the
secondary employer receives an economic advantage through lower prices because of
the primary employers labor policies. See Note, 40 MICH. L. REv. 603, 605 (1942). The
existence of a unity of interest has been sufficient to justify a secondary boycott of
the secondary employer under certain circumstances. Thus, a union seeking recognition
from the primary employer may picket the product of the primary employer while in
the hands of a distributor, see cases cited in note 20 supra, or a dealer who is the
recipient of services from the primary employer. People v. Muller, 286 N.Y. 281, 36
N.E.2d 206 (1941). The picketing must be directed at the product, and the secondary
employer must be a distributor, and not an ultimate consume, of the product. Note,
8 U. of Cmt. L. REv. 356 (1941). See, generally, Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 349.
22. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1946). See Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 U.S. 91 (1940); Note, 15 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 327, 338 (1947).
23. Collected and discussed in 2 TELLER, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 20.
24. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).. See Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769
(1942) ; Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942). Some state
cases have held that state -statutes banning secondary boycotts by name are unconstitu-
tional, restricting freedom of speech. E.g., Ex parte Blaney, 30 Cal.2d 643, 184 P.2d
892 (1947).
25. U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
26. See MiLLIS AND MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 651.
NOTES
tional disputes. Many employers were picketed and otherwise boycotted
for mere use of materials manufactured by employees who were members
of a rival union.27 Also, the restrictions on employer anti-union activities
under the Wagner Act eliminated much of the necessity for counter-
vailing union conduct. 28 Thus, within the last few years, limitations on
the use of secondary boycotts have been legislatively imposed by some
states29 and by the Federal Government.
Prior to 1947, the control of secondary boycotts was largely within
the province of the states. In that year the Taft-Hartley Act 30 amended
the NLRA to include, for the first time, several limitations on the
activities of labor unions and their agents. 31 One of the most important
of these amendments is Section 8(b) (4) (A), 32 which provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents . . . to engage in, or to induce or encourage the
employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted
refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services,
where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring . . .any
employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other pro-
ducer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business
with any other person.... I
This section is almost unchanged from the Bill drafted by the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.3 3  The House Bill3 4
contained provisions similar-in substance, although differing in form
and language. While Section 8(b) (4) (A) nowhere specifically men-
tions secondary boycotts, it was consistently referred to as the "sec-
27. See GREGoRY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 279-288.
28. See MILLIS AND MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 596.
29. Collected in 1 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 150
(Supp. 1950).
30. 61 STAT. 136- (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1951).
31. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 ITS.C. §158(b)
(Supp. 1951).
32. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4) (A) (Supp. 1951). Hereafter
often referred to as "the Section." Section 8(b) (4) (A) also proscribes forcing any
employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization. This pro-
vision is not directly concerned with secondary boycotts, has never been applied as yet,
and will not be discussed further in this note.
33. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). See SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Pt. 1) 35 (1947).
34. H.R. 3020 §§ 2(13) (14), 12(a) (3) (A), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The
House Bill divided secondary boycotis into "sympathy strikes" and "illegal boycotts."
See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50, 61 (1947).
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ondary boycott provision" when discussed in Congress. 3' There is no
indication of any congressional intent other than the prohibition of
secondary boycotts. The usual "horrible" examples cited by the pro-
ponents of the section were the refusal of a local union in New York
City to install electrical equipment not manufactured by local com-
panies 38 and the use of secondary boycotts in jurisdictional disputesA7
However, despite the contention that such boycotts should be distin-
guished from those instituted to protect wages and working conditions, 38
Congress clearly intended to make secondary boycotts unfair labor prac-
tices, without regard to, their purpose.39 It was believed that the area of
a labor dispute should be limited to the premises of the employer with
whom the dispute existed and that innocent third parties should not be
caught in a situation in which they had no direct concern. 40
Despite relative clarity of the'general congressional purpose, loose
draftsmanship and the lack of an accepted definition of "secondary boy-
cott" has placed the delineation of the coverage of the Section largely
with the National Labor Relations Board, subject to judicial review.
The validity of the Board's interpretation and application of the Section
was before the Supreme Court for the first time in four recent cases,
4 1
all written by Mr. Justice Burton and handed down on the same day.
A secondary boycott under the Section necessarily must involve
35. "It [the Senate Bill] gives employers . . . rights to invoke the processes of
the Board against unions which engage in certain enumerated unfair labor practices,
including secondary boycotts .... ." SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Pt. 1)
3 (1947). "Under paragraph A [of Section 8(b) (4)] strikes or boycotts, or attempts
to encourage such actions, are made violations of the act if the purpose is to force
an employer... to cease doing business with any other person." Id. at 22. For references
in debate on the floor of Congress to Section 8(b) (4) (A) as outlawing secondary
boycotts, see 93 CONG. Rac. 3838, 4198, 4834, 4844, 4845, 4867, 6859, 7529, 7537 (1947).
See also H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, 72 (1947).
36. SEN. RaP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Pt. 1) 22 (1947) ; 93 CONG. REc. 4199
(1947). This was the situation involved in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,
I.B.E.W., 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
37. "That is an example of the secondary boycott, the A.F. of L. sign hangers union
boycotting an employer using certain material because it was made by a CIO union."
Speech of Senator Taft, 93 CONG. REc. 3838 (1947). See also Id., at 4131, 4199, 7537.
38. This point was made in the President's State of the Union message to Congress,
January 6, 1947. 93 CoNG. REc. 136 (1947). See also SEN. RES. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Pt. 2) 1, 19 (1947) ; H.R. Doc. No. 334, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1947).
39. "It has been set forth that there are good secondary boycotts and bad secondary
boycotts. Our committee heard evidence for weeks and never succeeded in having
anyone tell us any difference between different kinds of secondary boycotts. So we have
broadened the provision dealing with secondary boycotts to make them an unfair labor
practice." Reinarks by Senator Taft, 93 CONG. RE. 4198 (1947).
40. See, e.g., Remarks by Senator Taft, 93 Cong. Rec. 3838, 4138 (1947).
41. NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951); NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951) ; International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951) ; Local 74, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707 (1951).
NO TES
three parties, although there may be more. These are: the labor organi-
zation engaging in the secondary activities, the employer who is subjected
to the secondary boycott (the secondary employer), and the employer
with whom the basic dispute exists and towards whom the pressure is
ultimately directed (the primary employei). Both the primary and the
secondary employer may file complaints of illegal secondary action.42
Section 10(1) of the LMRA requires that investigations of alleged
violations of Section 8(b) (4) (A), (B), and (C) be given priority
over all other cases. 43 If the investigating official finds reasonable cause
to believe that a violation is occurring, he must immediately seek a
temporary injunction from a federal district court, pending adjudication
by the NLRB. The injunction will be issued by the district judge on
a finding of reasonable cause to believe that the union is committing an
unfair labor practice.44 The Supreme Court affirmed the position'of the
Board that determinations in Section 10 (1) actions are not res judicata,
even as to the Board's jurisdiction of the complaint under the Act.45
The proceeding before the court is merely interlocutory, and Congress
did not contemplate that it should bar a hearing on the merits by the
Board.
Section 8(b) (4) (A), by its terms, is not applicable to all secondary
coercive activities. To be illegal, inducements of a strike or concerted
refusal to handle must be made to employees. Inducements made to an
employer, 48 supervisor,47 or single employee4" are not covered by the
Section. The, secondary company must be an "employer" or "person"
as defined in the Act,49 and the offending union must come within the
42. Schenley Distillers Corp., 78 N.L.R.B. 504 (1948).
43. 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (Supp. 1951).
44. Shore v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 173 F.2d 678 (3rd Cir. 1949); Douds
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 85 F.Supp. 429 (S.D. N.Y. 1949); Crane-
field v. Bricklayers Union, 78 F. Supp. 611 (W.D. Mich. 1948).
45. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 681 (1951).
46. Santa Ana Lumber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 937 (1949); accord, Schatte v. Inter-
national Alliance, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Studio Carpenters v. Loews, Inc., 182
F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1950).
47. Arkansas Express, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1951); Conway's Express, 87
N.L.R.B. 972 (1949). 1
48. Gould & Preisner, 82 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1197 (1949). This p6int was not among
those appealed to the Supreme Court, NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
341 U.S. 675 (1951).
49. Al J. Schneider Co. 87 N.L.R.B. 99 (1949); International Rice Milling Co.,
84 N.L.R.B. 360 (1949), reV'd, 183 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1951). The Board did not
appeal this part of the case. NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 668
n.2 (1951). Nevertheless, its position seems preferable to that of the Fifth Circdit.
There is no indication that the definition sections were not intended to apply to all
provisions of the Act. Furthermore, if they are utilized to limit those sections of
the Act benefiting unions, common fairness dictates that they also restrict that part of
the Act detrimental to unions. But see Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 781, 808 (1951).
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definition of "labor organization."5  Presumably, a consumers boycott,
even by employees, is not proscribed since the concerted refusal to use
must be "in the course of their employment." 51 The union conduct must
have the object of forcing the secondary employer to cease doing business
with another, although this need not be the sole objective. 52 The LMRA
is applicable only to those companies and unions whose activities affect
interstate commerce. 53 In addition, the Board has established certain
minimum requirements as to the size of the companies involved before
it will exercise its jurisdiction.54
A labor organization institutes a secondary boycott within the mean-
ing of the Act if is strikes or engages in a concerted refusal to handle
goods for the secondary employer with an object of forcing the company
to cease doing business with another employer. In NLRB v. Denver
Building & Construction Trades Council,55 a general contractor for a
construction project let a subcontract for electrical work to a company
employing non-union workmen. The employees of the general con-
tractor, working on the project, were members of various building trades
union locals affiliated with the Denver Council. The Council picketed
the project, stating that it was unfair, and informed-the general con-
tractor that his union employees would not work on the same job with
50. Di Giorgio Wine Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 720 (1949).
51. See NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, 191 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1951). Cf.
Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614 (1950), enforcement denied on other grounds, 191 F.2d
380 (6th Cir. 1951).
52. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 688 (1951).
The Section was amended in the Conference Committee to substitute "an object thereof
is" in place of "for the purpose of" in order to foreclose the possibility that the
Section would not be applied because one of the objects of the union activity was
lawful. See Supplementary Analysis by Senator Taft, 93 CONG. REc. 6859 (1947).
53. The broad extent of the commerce power is re-emphasized in NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 683 (1947). The complainant sub-
contractor engaged in business only in Colorado. 'His sole connection with interstate
commerce was the purchase from outside the state of some 65% of the approximately
$85,000 worth of raw materials used annually. Only $350 worth of materials were used
by the complainant on the project where the secondary boycott occurred, and none
of this was specifically shown to have been purchased in interstate commerce. This was
sufficient to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. See Stern, The
Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 883 (1946), for a
complete description of the modern development of the commerce clause. See also
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ; NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
54. These requirements, couched mostly in terms of dollar volume annually of
interstate business, are set out in 15 NLRB ANN. RE'. 5 (1950). See Note, 64 H.'A.v.
L. REv. 781, 785 (1951). In secondary boycott cases, the dollar volume of interstate
business of the primary employer and of the secondary employer to the extent affected
by the secondary boycott may be added together, if neither alone is enough to meet these
jurisdictional requirements. Jamestown Builders Exchange, 93 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (1951).
See also Paul W. Speer, Inc., 94 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (1951); Screw Machine Products
Co., 94 N.L.R.B. No. 234 (1951); General Seat & Back Mfg. Corp., 27 L.R.R.M. 1583
(1951). And see Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1951).
55. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
NOTES
the non-union men. The picketing was found to be a signal for the
Council's affiliated unions to strike, under its by-laws, and the union
employees of the general contractor 'walked off their jobs at the project.
Therefore, both the Council and the affiliated union violated the Section;
having struck the general contractor with whom no legitimate dispute
existed to force cancellation of the contract with the subcontractor.
Since Section 8(b) (4) (A) expressly proscribes strikes and con-
certed refusals to handle materials or perform services for secondary
employers, and because secondary strikes and product boycotts were
generally illegal at common law,56 there is little doubt that Congress
intended that they be covered by the Section. Although no case involving
a concerted refusal has come before the Supreme Court, they have
been forbidden by the Board.57 Some difficulty has been experienced in
determining the object of the union's action. Thus, refusing to work on
the same job with non-unionized employees has been a traditional labor
protest.58 However, frequently this policy can only be effectuated by
the union members refusing to work for their employer. When two.
employers are involved, the only recourse of the struck employer is
to discontinue dealing with the non-union employer, so as to remove
the non-union employees from the job. Thus, the refusal to work with
non-union men, under such circumstances, must have an object of forcing
the secondary employer to cease doing business with the employer of the
non-union employees. 59
Engaging in a strike against or a concerted refusal to handle for a
secondary employer is normally executed by a union representing the
employees of the secondary employer. On the other hand, inducing or
encouraging the employees of a secondary employer to strike or engage
in a concerted refusal to handle ordinarily is committed by the labor
organization involved in the dispute with the primary employer. If the
union representing the secondary employees instructs its members to
carry out the inducements of the primary union, then both unions may
violate Section 8(b) (4) (A). 60 These inducements usually take the
form of a picket line, although they may consist of unfair lists or some
56. See 1 TEi.LE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 103.
57. Schenley Distillers Corp., 78 N.L.RB. 504 (1948), enforced sub nom., NLRB
v. Wine, Liquor, & Distillery Workers, 178 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1949). Cf. NLRB v.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950).
58. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951)
(dissenting opinion).
59. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 688 (1951).
60. Di Giorgio Wine Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 720 (1949); Howland Dry Goods, 85
N.L.R.B. 1937 (1949), enforcement denied in part on other grounds sub. non., NLRB v.
Service Trade Chauffeurs, 191 F.2d 65 (1951).
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other form of communication with the secondary employees. Whether
the inducements involve violence, or threats of violence, is immaterial
insofar as Section 8(b) (4) (A) is concerned. 61
Contentions that the Section could not constitutionally be applied to
prohibit peaceful picketing in furtherance of a secondary boycott were
rejected in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB. 12
The progressive encroachments during the last few years on the Thorn-
hill-v. Alabama"3 doctrine, that picketing is a method of speech, 64 pro-
vided precedent for the Court in its summary disposition of the free
speech argument. It was only necessary to state the obvious conclusion
that since the states could constitutionally ban picketing in pursuit of
an illegal objective, 5 Congress could do likewise.
Several trial examiners 60 considered inducements in the form of
speech, even if not constitutionally protected, to be exempted from the
operation of Section 8(b) (4) (A) by Section 8(c).7 The latter Section
provides that the expression or dissemination of views shall not constitute
evidence of an unfair labor practice in the absence of threat of reprisal,
or force, or promise of benefit. Thus, it was thought that peaceful
picketing, unfair lists, and other communications could not be evidence
of engaging in a secondary boycott. However, both the NLRB and the
Supreme Court rejected this approach in favor of giving full effect to
Section 8(b) (4) (A). s This appears to be in accordance with the spirit
of the Act, although severely limiting the literal meaning of Section
8(c).119 There is no indication that Congress intended to immunize
61. NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672 (1951).
62. 341 U.S. 694 (1951). Suggestions that the Section violates the Fifth and
Thirteenth Amendments have been summarily rejected by the lower courts. NLRB v.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950) ; NLRB v.
Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 181 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1950);
NLRB v. Wine, Liquor, & Distillery Workers, 178 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1949).
63. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
64. See Armstrong, Where Are We Going With Picketing?, 36 CALIF. L. REV.
1 (1948); Comment, 49 Mica. L. REv. 1048 (1951); Note, 16 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 701
(1949) ; Note, 98 U. oF PA. L. Rmv. 545 (1950). For some views on the merits of this
doctrine, see Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreve Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 MIcH.
L. REV. 1037 (1943) ; Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARv. L REv. 180 (1942);
Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARv. L. REv. 513 (1943); Teller,
Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply, 56 HARv. L. REv. 532 (1943).
65. Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) ; Hughes v. Superior Court,
339 U.S. 460 (1950) ; Gibboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
66. See, e.g., Samuel Langer, 82 N.L.RB. 1028, 1045 (1949); Sealright Pacific,
Ltd., 82 N.L.R.B. 271, 288 (1949).
67. 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S:C. § 158(c) (Supp. 1951).
68. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694(1951).
69. See Note, 44 ILL. L.' REv. 401 (1949).
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peaceful picketing in conjunction with a secondary b6ycott, greatly
reducing the effectiveness of the prohibition of secondary activities.
Section 8(c) was included in the Act primarily for the purpose of safe-
guarding the right of employers to discuss with their employees labor-
management problems.70  In addition, the Court placed reliance upon
the fact that no similar provision was applicable to Section 303,71 which
was intended to be identical in coverage with Section 8(b) (4).
A literal application of Section 8(b) (4) (A), encompassinig a11'
inducements to employees of secondary. employers, would seemingly
include some union action which has traditionally been considered
primary, i.e., coercive activities principally directed at the employer with
whom a basic labor dispute exists.72 When a union pickets an employer
in the course of a primary dispute, necessarily, one of its objects is to
induce the employees of other companies to refuse to cross the picket
line and enter the premises of the primary employer. As a result, the
secondary employers may be forced to cease doing business with the
primary employer for the duration of the picketing. Indeed, the Fifth
Circuit adopted this interpretation, stating that the terms of the Section
made no distinction between primary and secondary picketing.73
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Inter-
national Rice Milling Co.74 The Teamsters Union established a picket
line around a mill operated by Kaplan Rice Mills in an attempt to
obtain recognition as bargaining agent for certain Kaplan employees.
Two employees of a customer of Kaplan, dispatched in a truck to pick
up a cargo of grain, refused to cross the picket line. The Court found
no violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A) since the union's conduct did not
amount to an inducement or encouragement of a concerted refusal to
handle by the customer's employees. The opinion emphasized that the
70. See Speech by Senator Taft, 93 CONG. Rac. 6443 (1947); Supplementary An-
alysis by Senator Taft, 93 CoNG. R. 6859 (1947); GREGoRy, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 429.
71. 61 STzAT. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (Supp. 1951). This section permits
suits in the federal district courts to recover damages caused by unfair labor practices.
72. See Petro 'Primary' and Secondary Labor Action, 1, LAB. L.J. 339 (1950);
Petro, Taft-Hartley and the Secondary Boycott, 1 LAB. L.. 835 (1950). Professor
Petro contends that the literal meaning of Section 8(b) (4) should be qualified only
to the extent permitted by the proviso attached to it. This proviso directs that the
section shall not be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person- to enter
upqn the premises of any employer, other than his own, if the employer is being
struck by a representative of his employees who he is required to recognize under
the Act. However, the proviso has never been construed oi: applied ,and appears to
be an inconsistent remnant of an earlier draft of the Act. It exempts only a refusal
by a person, and not refusals by a union or its agents to whom the Section applies.
See Tower, The Puzzling Proviso, 1 LAB. L.J. 1019 (1950).
73. International Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 21 (1951).
74. 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
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sole inducement was a request to the driver of a single truck not to
cross the picket line; that there was no attempt to induce more wide-
spread activity; and that the picketing was limited to the premises of
the primary employer. Furthermore, the legislative history and Section
13 of the Taft-Hartley Act indicated that Congress did not intend to
restrict primary strikes under Section 8(b) (4) (A) merely because of
incidental secondary consequences. 75
'the Rice Milling decision leaves considerable doubt concerning the
permissible extent of primary, picketing under the Section. No definite
criteria for determining when picketing induces concerted action were
established. The Court noted, however, that ". . . inducements or en-
couragements reaching individual employees of neutral employers only
as they happen to approach the picketed place of business generally are
not aimed at concerted, as distinguished from individual, conduct by
such employees." 7 6 Presumably, the union must seek an active agree-
ment by the secondary employees, or their representatives, not to cross
the picket line before there would be an inducement of concerted action.77
Even so, a concerted refusal to handle, induced by primary picketing,
is not per se an unlawful secondary boycott under the Rice Milling case.
The Court merely stated that the absence of any inducement to concerted
activities was sufficient to decide that case. Furthermore, the Court
partially relied upon the congressional intent not to interfere with primary
strikes but only to prohibit secondary boycotts under the Section. The
NLRB, in first establishing a dichotomy between primary and secondary
action, has based none of its decisions on the presence or absence of an
inducement to concerted action. Rather, it has depended almost entirely
upon legislative history."7 Generally, the Board has considered any
union inducement which invites conduct by the secondary employees
only on the premises of the primary employer to be primary and, thus,
permissible under Section 8(b) (4) (A).7 9
Primary union activity which is aimed at the employer with whom
the dispute exists, and which affects' other emplkyers only incidentally,
75. Section 13 provides that the Act shall Inot 'be construed so as to effect the
right to strike in any way except as is specifically provided therein. 61 STAT. 151
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (Supp. 1951).
76. 341 U.S. 665, 671 (1951).
77. For an excellent discussion of concerted activities under Section 7, see Cox,
The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951).
78. See Grauman Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 755 (1949) ; Schultz Refrigerated Services, 87
N.L.R.B. 502 (1949); Ryan Construction Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949); International
Rice Milling Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 360 (1949); Pure Oil Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949).
79. See Interborough News Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 2135 (1950). See also cases cited
in note 52 supra.
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should be lawful even though it induces a concerted refusal by secondary
employees. s0 Admittedly, any distinctions that may be drawn between
primary and secondary action will, to some extent, be artificial and
arbitrary since there -is no sharp natural break between the two."' Any
union activity which interferes with the operation of a primary employer
is almost certain to cause some inconveniences to other employers doing
business with the primary employer. Nevertheless, in order to conform
with "the dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor
organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary
labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from
pressures in controversies not their own,18 2 some line must be drawn.
The most logical place to make this division, under the circumstances,
is to permit union activity which is principally intended to publicize to
the primary employees and to the public generally the existence of the
labor dispute. Union conduct which has as its main purpose the induce-
ment of employees of secondary employers to strike or engage in a
concerted refusal to handle would be illegal under the Section. The
determination of whether union activity is primary or secondary would
therefore be essentially a factual question and should be left to the trial
examiners and the Board, unless clearly arbitrary or unsupported by
substantial evidence.
Whatever the test, the location of the union conduct is generally
the most important single factor in determining whether it is primary
or secondary.8 3 Picketing the secondary employer is clearly a violation
of Section 8(b) (4) (A). 8 4 The resulting extension of the area of the
labor dispute was one of the abuses sought to be prevented, and the
picketing directly affects the secondary employer and his employees.
Similarly, the placing of the secondary employer on an unfair list for
. 80. In NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, 191 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1951), the
Rice Milling decision was interpreted to mean ". . . that a union may lawfully inflict
harm on a neutral employer, without violating § 8(b) (4), so long as the harm is
merely incidental to a traditionally lawful primary strike, conducted at the place
where the primary employer does business."
81. See GREGoRY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 125.
82. Quoted from NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S.
675, 692 (1951).
83. "The limitation of the complaint to an incident in the geographically restricted
area near the mill [the premises of the primary employer] is significant, although
not necessarily conclusive." NLRB v.* International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665,
671 (1951). See NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, 191 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1951);
15 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 138 (1950).
84. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694
(1951) ; NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & joiners, 184 F.2d 60 (10th
Cir. 1950); accord, Printing Specialties Union v. LeBaron, 171 F.2d 331 (9th Cir.
1948).
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his continuation of business dealings with the primary employer is an
unlawful secondary boycott8 5
The Board has permitted some union inducements which have oc-
curred other than on the premises of the primary employer. Thus, it
was not a violation of the Section to send "hot cargo" letters to employees
of a secondary employer."( In Interborough News Co., 8 7 the Board
found no secondary boycott when agents of the union visited the
secondary employer's premises and orally requested his employees not
to deliver newspapers published by the secondary employer to the primary
employer's newsstands. These exceptions have been rationalized by the
Board on the ground that the union solicited action by the secondary
employees to take place only on the premises of the primary employer.
Also, "hot cargo" letters were said to be traditional primary action.
However, the fact remains that in each case employees of a secondary
employer were directly and specifically encouraged to engage in a con-
certed refusal to work for their employer, thereby seeking to force a cessa-
tion of business with another employer. This encouragement occurred on
or near the premises of the secondary employer and could not have been
chiefly for the purpose of publicizing the disagreement with the primary
employer to the primary employees or to the public generally. Further-
more, it would seem to be immaterial to the secondary employer whether
the solicited secondary action occurs on his own premises or on the
premises of the primary employer. The effect is the same in either event.
Hence, these activities seem closely analogous to picketing of the sec-
ondary employer and should have been prohibited as secondary boycotts
under Section 8(b) (4) (A).
However, activities which take place off the premises of the primary
employer, but which are not directed at the employees of particular
secondary employer , should be permitted. Thus, placing the primary
employer on an unfair list is not a secondary boycott,88 unless used as
a signal for a strike or concerted refusal to handle by the employees of
another employer."9 The use of unfair lists in this manner is ordinarily
85. NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & joiners, supra note 84.
86. Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (1950); Pure Oil Co., 84
N.L.I.B. 315 (1949). These letters usually request that shipments of the products
of an 'employer not be handled by other union members, the products being "hot"
because of a dispute between the producer and his employees.
87. 90 N.L.R.B. 2135 (1950).
88. Kim'sey Mfg. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1168 (1950); Santa Ana Lumber Co., 87
N.L.R.B. 937 (1949); Grauman Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 755 (1949), overruling, Osterink
Construction Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 228 (1949).
89. Western, Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1951). The union telephoned the employees
of distributors of Western's products, notifying them that Western had been placed
on the unfair list.
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a means of publicizing the existence of a labor dispute to union members
generally and is not aimed at the employees of any particulars secondary
employer. Other means of publicizing a dispute to the primary employees
or the public at large, such as advertisements, rallies, and speeches
should also be considered to be primary, rather than secondary, boycotts.
Similarily, Section 8(b) (4) (A) would not seem to preclude picket-
ing and other inducements which occur only on or near the premises
of the primary employer and which are directed at the primary em-
ployer. Primary picketing was never considered to be a secondary boy-
cott at common law,90 and there is no evidence in the legislative history
of an intention to include it within the prohibitions of the Section.
Picketing is a fundamental adjunct to the right to strike, which the
Taft-Hartley Act specifically reaffirms in Section 13. It is the principal
means whereby the union publicizes the existence of a dispute with the
employer both to the primary employees and to the public at large.91
However, a showing that the picketing is used as a signal for a concerted
refusal to handle or a strike by secondary employees, as when there
has been a prearranged agreement with the secondary employees to refuse
to cross the picket line, should convert the picketing into a secondary
boycott. Perhaps it would be preferable to bar the enforcement of the
agreement rather than the picketing since the former is the actual
inducement to the secondary boycott. This would permit the continuance
of the picketing for lawful purposes. Nevertheless, the usual practice
has been to order the picketing to be ceased when it becomes a part of a
course of illegal conduct. 92
The Rice Milling case would permit most primary picketing limited
solely to the premises of the primary employer, even if Section 8(b) (4)
(A) should not be construed to permit all primary picketing which is
directed principally at the primary employer and employees, as has
been suggested. As the Court pointed out, union inducements reaching
individual employees of neutral employers only as they happen to ap-
proach the primary employer's place of business generally does not, and
is not intended to, induce concerted action.93 But, as frequently is the
case, more than one company may engage in business at the same general
location. Picketing of one of the companies in furtherance of a primary
90. 1 TELLER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 111; Barnard and Graham, supra note 3,
at 141.
91. See 1 TELLER, op. cit. spra note 1, §§ 109, 110.
92. See Western, Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1951). Analogous is the rule that
picketing, which would otherwise be constitutionally protected from restraint, may
be enjoining in its entirety when it becomes intertwined with an aura of violence.
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
93. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
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strike may well result in a refusal of all of the employees of the secondary
employer to cross the picket line- without further inducement on the
part of the striking union.
The NLRB considers picketing of the dual situs to be lawful
primary action if clearly directed at the primary employer. It has been
immaterial whether the primary or the secondary employer is the owner
of the situs, or whether they are doing business with one another.94 This
is in accordance with the suggested distinction between primary union
activities with incidental secondary effect and those aimed at employees
of a particular secondary employer or employers. The conflicting con-
gressional purposes of permitting primary union coercion, while for-
bidding that which is brought to bear through the medium of neutral
third parties, are especially difficult to reconcile in this situation. Picket-
ing of the primary employer may interrupt the entire business of a
secondary employer on the premises. If the two employers are doing
business with one another, the pressure is increased on the primary
employer. Nevertheless, the mere presence of another employer on the
same premises should not, in itself, deprive a union of the right to picket
in conjunction with a strike against the primary employer. However,
the picketing should be required to be conducted in such a manner as
to interfere as little as possible with the secondary employer's affairs.
Thus, the placards carried should reveal that the picketing is directed
only at the primary employer, and any prearranged agreements for the
secondary employees to respect the primary picket line would be per-
suasive evidence of an intent to institute a secondary boycott.
Often, an employer's operations are not fixed at any one location.
A typical example is the trucking industry, where the greater portion
of the business is transacted in temporary stops on the premises of other
employers. Effective picketing of the primary employer is usually feasible
only while his trucks are present on the premises of his customers. The
Board has ruled that such picketing is permissible primary action if
properly limited. 95 The actual situs of the dispute with the primary
employer and the place of employment of the primary employees are
said to be at the location of the truck. The picketing must be strictly
confined to those instances when the employees of the primary employer
are engaged in their normal employment while on the premises of the
94. Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (1950) ; Ryan Construction Co.,
85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949); Pure Oil Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949); accord, Deena
Artware, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 732 (1949).
95. Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (1950); Schultz Refrigerated
Services, 87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949). See Johns, Picketing and Secondary Boycotts
Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 2 LAB. L.J. 257, 266 (1951); Note, 64 HARv. L. REsv.
781, 801 (1951).
NOTES
secondary employer; it must be reasonably close to the location of the
primary employer's operations; it must clearly disclose that the dispute
is with the primary employer; and probably it must be the only available
effective means of bringing direct pressure on the primary employer. 9 6
Although the "roving situs" doctrine was approved by the Second
Circuit as being in conformity with the four Supreme Court decisions
on Section 8(b) (4) (A) , 7 its validity seems questionable. A widespread
extension of the area of the dispute becomes possible, and the picketing
occurs entirely on or near the premises of the secondary employer. Hence,
only the employees of the particular secondary employer and the primary
employees present are likely to come in contact with the picket line.
At best, it seems that roving picketing should be lawful only in those
situations where the primary, employees can be reached in no other
manner.9 8 The fact that it was possible to reach the primary employees
by picketing the primary employer's premises would be compelling evi-
dence that the roving picketing was intended primarily to induce the
secondary employees to strike or engage in a concerted refusal to handle.
The construction industry presents some unique problems in this
area. Often three or more employers may be affected: the owner, the
general contractor, and one or more subcontractors. The general con-
tractor and subcontractors are on the premises only temporarily, with
their headquarters usually situated elsewhere. Further complications
arise from the general practice of the building trades unions, reinforced
by provisions in their constitutions and by-laws, to respect the picket lines
of their sister unions and to refuse to work on the same job with
non-union men.99
Picketing directed at the entire project, because of a dispute with
only part of the employers present, is definitely a secondary boycott
96. Kanawha Coal Operators Ass'n, 94 N.L.R.B. No. 236 (1951); Sterling Bever-
ages, 90 N.L.R.B. 401 (1950) ; cases cited in note 95 supra. Cf. Santa Ana Lumber Co.,
87 N.L1RB. 937 (1949). But, if the trucks are operated by an independent con-
tractor engaged. in business with the primary employer, then it would be a secondary
boycott to picket the trucks. Cf. Sealright Pacific, Ltd., 82 N.L.R.B. 271 (1949).
97. NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, 191 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1951). The court
reversed in part the decision of the Board in Howland Dry Goods, 85 N.L.R.B.
1037 (1949), and remanded the case for findings of fact pertinent to the question
of whether the roving situs doctrine could appropriately be applied. The union had
picketed the premises of customers of the trucking company, with whom the primary
dispute existed. Since the Board had not formulated the roving situs doctrine at
the time the case was first decided, it made no findings bearing on whether the
picketing had been directed at the primary employer and whether it was limited to
the times that the primary employer's trucks were present.
98. See Note, 64 H.Av. L. Rv. 781, 802 (1951).
99. The problems of the construction industry under the Taft-Hartley Act are
extensively treated in Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 673 (1951).
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within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (A). 100 Such picketing neces-
sarily is directed at all the employees working on the project, including
those of secondary employers. However, in International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 10' the Court, while finding a secondary
boycott, noted that the picketing had not been directed at the sub-
contractor with whom the dispute existed. Apparently, this has also
been true in the other construction industry cases where a secondary
boycott has been found..0 2 There is no manifest reason why the same
principles should not be applicable to the construction cases that are
followed in other instances involving a dual situs, including the "roving
titus" doctrine. Indeed, the situs of the dispute would usually seem to
be more definitely located at a construction project than at the location
of a truck in a trucking industry case. A contractor may well be
engaged at the project for a considerable period with his employees
spending all their working hours at its location. Therefore, it would
be only at the project that they could be reached by picketing. However,
the prevalence of agreements to respect one another's picket lines among
the construction unions, and the fact that they ordinarily operate in
unity through local councils, should make it easier to prove that the
picketing was merely a signal for the secondary employees to strike, as
in the Denver Council case.
Under certain circumstances, labor activities which ordinarily would
constitute a secondary boycott have been held not violative of Section
8(b) (4) (A). Thus, the Board has refused to prohibit a boycott of a
secondary employer who is not a "neutral" in the dispute between the
union and the primary employer °.0 3 Its position has been based upon the
legislative history.'04
Section 8(b) (4) (A) is not inherently limited to boycotts of neu-
trals. Moreover, if carried to its logical extreme, the effectiveness of the
Section would be destroyed. FeW, if any, employers are completely
neutral in regard to labor disputes of other employers with whom they
100. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694
(1951) ; Local 74, United- Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 341 U.S. .707 (1951).
101. 341 U.S. 694, 699 (1951).
102. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951);
Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707 (1951) ;
Roane-Anderson Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 679 (1949); Montgomery Fair Co., 82 N.L.R.B.
211 (1949).
103. Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 54 (1949); Conway's Express, 87
N.L.R.B. 972 (alternative holding) ; accord, Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Archi-
tects, 75 "F.Supp. 672 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
104. "This provision [§ 8(b) (4) (A)] makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary
boycott to injure the business of a third person who is wholly uncowcerned in the
disagreement between an employer and his employees." Remarks of Senator Taft, 93
CONG. Rxc. 4198 (1947) (emphasis added).
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have business relations. 10 5 Any advantages gained by the union could
well reflect in higher prices to, or reduced purchases from, the secondary
employers. And, from the viewpoint of the union, those employers who
continue to transact business with the primary employer during a strike
are aiding the latter tO resist the union's demands.10 6
As Congress doubtless did not intend that the Section be so emas-
culated, a considerable interest in the labor relations of the primary
employer is necessary before a secondary employer becomes an "ally" of
the primary employer. The Board has required that there be substantial
ownership or managerial control between the two companies- 0 7 The
Supreme Court indicated, in the Denver Council case, that the connection
between the two employers must be closer than that of independent
contractors. A contractor-subcontractor relationship was not sufficient
to make the Section inapplicable even though the contractor exercised
some control over the operations of the sub-contractor.
0 8
In Conway's Express,10 9 the NLRB held that a union and employer,
in their collective bargaining agreement, may reserve to the union the
right to refuse to handle the goods of other employers who are engaged
in a labor dispute. The agreement was said not to be opposed to the
policy of the Act, and a refusal to handle in conformance with the
agreement does not violate Section 8(b) (4) (A), as the secondary em-
ployer has consented to the refusal. 110 There is no apparent reason why
the secondary employer should not be bound by his prior assent to the
secondary boycott. However, the primary employer should not likewise
be precluded from instituting a complaint because of the contract pro-
vision between the secondary employer and the union, unless the Section
was enacted solely for the protection of secondary employers and did
105. See Gan.oaY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 123; Barnard and Graham, supra
note 3, at 154; Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 354.
106. There is even less of a "neutral" 'relationship in the construction industry
than is true of industry generally. Ordinarily, much of the actual work is done by
subcontractors under the overall supervision of the general contractor. The use of
subcontractors employing non-union labor at lower wages will often result in a direct
financial benefit to the general contractor. In the rapidly shifting employment picture
of the construction industry, the existence of this incentive to indirectly employ non-
union men poses a serious threat to the existence of the building trades unions. See
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 326, 336 (1951) ; MILLIS AND
BROWN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 468; Note, 60 YALE L.J. 673, 684 (1951).
107. See cases cited in note 75 supra.
108. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951).
109. 87 N.L.RIB. 972 (1949).
110. The union relies upon such an agreement at its own risk, even if it acts
in good faith. Should the Board find that the alleged illegal activity is not permitted
by the agreement, then it will order the activity to be ceased as an unlawful secondary
boycott if the other necessary factors are present. Western Express, 91 N.LR.B.
No. 45 (1950).
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not also have the purpose of shielding primary employers from the
economic pressures caused by secondary boycotts. Since the primary
employer is sufficiently interested to be entitled to lodge a complaint
against a secondary boycott,"1 it does not appear that the secondary
employer and the union could bargain away this right.
It is apparent that the Taft-Hartley Act has largely denied to unions
the use of an important weapon in labor-management bargaining; that
of secondary pressures.brought to bear on the priiary employer through
the medium of third parties. The Board and the courts have conscien-
tiously attempted to effectuate the objectives of Congress. A few sec-
ondary union activities are not proscribed by the Act; especially direct
approaches to the secondary employer rather than his employees and
boycotts of employers closely connected with the primary employer.
However, strikes and concerted refusals to handle by the employees of a
secondary employer with an object of forcing the employer to cease doing
business with another is clearly an unfair labor practice. The status of
inducements to strike or engage in a concerted refusal to handle for the
secondary employer is less certain, but probably such inducements must
be principally directed at the employees of the secondary employer before
they constitute an unlawful secondary boycott. In most instances,
picketing of'the primary employer, and other traditional primary acti-
vities, are permissible under Section 8(b) (4) (A) despite incidental
secondary effects. Whether union conduct is aimed principally at the
primary employer and employees or at the employees of secondary
employers is fundamentally a factual question. Important indications
of the purpose of the union activity are its location, the availability of
other adequate means of publicizing the dispute to the primary employees
and the public, and the existence or absence of prior agreements with
the secondary employees concerning their reaction to the activity.
In view of the importance of factual determinations in the secondary
boycott cases, it is perhaps significant that the Supreme Court upheld the
NLRB in all four decisions arising under the Section, emphasizing that
"the Board's interpretations of the Act and the Board's application of
it in doubtful situations are entitled to weight." 1 2 Indeed, the Court
came close to adopting the approach of NLRB v. Hearst Publications'3
in results, although careful not to. ascribe to it in language. Since the
'111. Schenley Distillers Corp., 78 N.L.B. 504 (1948).
112. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
113. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). The Hearst case held that administrative interpreta-
tions of a statute as applicable to a particular set of facts are conclusive on the courts
if they have a rational basis and warrant in the record. See Davis, Scope of Review
of Federal Administrative Action, 50 COL. L. REv. 559, 569 (1950). See also, Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
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resolution of most of the problems under the Section are so dependent
on the facts in each case, there is every reason to accept the decisions
of the Board unless clearly arbitrary or unsupported by substantial evi-
dence. This should be an important factor when future orders of the
Board under Section 8(b) (4) (A) are reviewed by the courts.
INCREASING LAND ALIENABILITY THROUGH RE-RECORDING
ACTS-THE INDIANA STATUTE
The usefulness of land as a commercial commodity depends upon
the degree of title alienability which can be assured landowners. Impedi-
ments to ease of conveyance, arise largely from the fact that there may
exist in the same parcel of land various interests, both possessory and
non-possessory, present and future. This multiple ownership creates
complexity of land titles and the possibility of conflicting claims, with
resulting deterrents to alienability. The risks, perhaps, are unsubstantial
while the parties originally involved are still alive. However, the passage
of time eliminates witnesses, dims recollections, and destroys useful.
records, rendering the deterrents more serious by aggravating the task
of resolving conflicts. Moreover, interests originally substantial may
themselves become nominal. Yet, if their unimportance cannot readily
be determined, alienability of valid claims will effectually be deterred.
Largely within the last decade eight states have undertaken to
eliminate much of the needless complexity surrounding land titles, and
thus to encourage their free alienability, by enacting legislation requiring
periodic re-recording of interests in land. Indiana's statute, dating from
1947, was the sixth to be enacted. These statutes may descriptively be
termed "re-recording acts," although re-recording is a misnomer since
their compass extends to interests not within the purview of the tradi-
tional recording system. The impact of this legislation on the problem
of title alienability can be extensive and salutary. In order to assess
its full significance, however, it is desirable to examine the limited
effectiveness of orthodox methods previously available to eliminate deter-
rents to alienability, and then to observe the manner in 'which the
re-recording acts supplement these devices.
Several traditional, methods exist by which clouds on title may be
defeated. Three of these-recitals in deeds, affidavits, and curative acts
-correct fbrmalistic defects in land records. Recitals and affidavits are
mainly evidentiary devices to shift the burden of proof to the challenging
party. For example, recitals in a deed that it was signed and sealed
